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Comparative Analysis of
New Legislation in Florida,
Illinois, and Wisconsin on
Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders
in Non-Hospital Settings
This article focuses on the history
and application of one of the newest
types of end-of-life decision-making
documents.
By Susan U. Ladwig
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member of the Employee Benefits Department. Ms.
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University Law School in 2001. She was a member of
the Elder's Advisor Journalfor two years, and served as
Articles Editor during the 2000-01 academic year.

ver the past twenty years there has
been growing patient involvement
in decision-making about end-oflife medical treatments. Every state
has now given legal recognition to
the use of advance directives for end-of-life treatments encompassed in such documents as living wills
and durable powers of attorney for health care.1 The
federal government has also endorsed the participation of patients in healthcare decision-making
through the passage of the Patient Self-Determination Act that became effective in December 1991 as
part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990 (Act). 2 The Act covers all health care facilities
that receive Medicaid or Medicare funding such as
hospitals, nursing homes, home health agencies, and
health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Under
the Act, these organizations must provide patients
with written information on their rights under state
law to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment,
and their right to formulate advance directives regarding future medical treatment in case of their
incapacity. 3 While there is a continuing debate as to
the success of the legislation in enhancing patient
autonomy, 4 the Act recognizes the right to self-determination and the importance of documenting a
patient's treatment wishes.
This article focuses on the history and application of one of the newest types of end-of-life
decision-making documents to receive statutory recognition by states-a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order
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operative in a non-hospital setting-as recently described in a comprehensive national survey by
Charles P. Sabatino.5 By specifically examining statutes, health regulations, and emergency medical
protocols in Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin, this
article explores how varying conceptual approaches
influence the requirements for non-hospital DNR
orders as they apply to elderly persons. Besides
having distinct approaches to the DNR order, each
of these states has recently adopted new statutes,
regulations, or protocols for non-hospital DNR
orders. The article also presents several cases providing judicial interpretation of statutory standards
for DNR orders that address end-of-life issues affecting the elderly. The article concludes with
recommendations for elder law attorneys who may
be asked to counsel clients regarding the use of DNR
orders in coordination with other types of advance
directives.
A Historical View of the Use of DNR Orders
"'Do not resuscitate'(DNR) or 'no code' orders are
physicians' orders which communicate to nursing
and hospital staff that resuscitative measures are not
be taken in the event a patient experiences a cardiopulmonary arrest." 6 Resuscitation treatments are
usually distinguished from measures designed to sustain life, such as the use of artificial means of nutrition
to improve ventilation
and hydration or measures
7
or cardiac function.
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) as a treatment for cardiac arrest is a relatively recent
innovation and was first described in the medical
literature in 1960, according to an article in the New
England Journal of Medicine that traced the early
history of the treatment.' Six years after the first
medical report on the treatment, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences
recommended instructing all medical and professional paramedical and allied health care personnel
in the technique. 9 By the 1970s, CPR was routinely
administered to hospital patients who suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest. However, questions about the
unexamined and indiscriminate use of CPR began
to surface. In 1974, the National Conference on Standards for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and
Emergency Cardiac Care reported that CPR was inappropriate in certain cases. 10 A telling article
published in the New EnglandJournal of Medicine
in 1976 suggested "withholding of life-sustaining
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therapy, including CPR, from the terminally ill was
an open secret in the medical profession. " "
As the medical profession began to reexamine
12
its use of CPR, the 1976 case of In re Quinlan
brought focus upon the right of patients to refuse
medical treatment even though the lack of treatment
may result in death. 3 In this case, a hospital refused
a father's request to remove his adult daughter's respirator even though she was in a vegetative state with
no known cure.1 4 In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that there
is a right to die under the unwritten constitutional
right of privacy."5 Within two years of this highly
publicized case, attitudes toward end-of-life decisionmaking began to change, and several states adopted
statutes that formally recognized written statements
by patients requesting that certain types of medical care be discontinued under certain medical
situations. 6
In 1988, New York enacted the first Orders-Notto-Resuscitate statute after the New York State Task
Force on Life and Law discovered that DNR orders
were being issued covertly without the consent of
the patient or family and that CPR was being given
when medically inappropriate.1 7 The statute, which
was very comprehensive, served as a model for legislation in states addressing the use of CPR and the
entry of DNR orders in hospital settings.18 DNR
orders had been openly acknowledged, and since
January 1, 1988, all facilities that are accredited by
the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) must have a
policy on withholding resuscitative services.1 9
In the medical community, "CPR is the only form
of life-sustaining treatment that is provided routinely
without consent of the patient. ' 20 In fact, CPR is
provided unless there is a formal DNR order entered
on a patient's chart." For instance, the New York
DNR statute presumes a patient's consent to CPR
unless there is an order not to resuscitate. 2 The statutes in seven states (including New York) explicitly
state that consent to CPR is presumed in absence of
a DNR order or directive. 23 While in most circumstances a patient's informed consent is legally
required for medical treatment, under common law
there is an emergency exception to informed consent when the patient is incapable of giving or
receiving information. In these cases, it is presumed
that the patient would consent to treatment.2 Some
DNR statutes ignore the common law presumption,
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however. For instance, the DNR statutes in Arkansas and Montana explicitly provide that absence of
a DNR order or directive creates no presumption
26
about the patient's intent to be resuscitated.
Several medical articles have questioned the use
of CPR as a presumed treatment for elderly persons
because of its medical ineffectiveness in certain
cases and its overriding disregard for informed consent. One study published in the New England
Journal of Medicine surveyed the attitudes of 163
elderly women toward CPR. It concluded that "although age alone does not preclude candidacy for
CPR, the changed attitudes and values of old people
are at least as germane to case selection as are any
other considerations. 27 Another article published in
The Journalof the American GeriatricsSociety suggested eliminating the presumption for CPR
administration for nursing home patients. The study
reported limited benefits of CPR for nursing home
patients because survival rates were as low as one
percent. 2 The physicians found that despite CPR in
the nursing home, the majority of patients died in
the emergency room and most of those who were
admitted to the hospital died within five days of admission. 29 The authors explained that "[c]urrent
policy in nursing homes dictates that CPR be attempted on all residents unless a specific order to
the contrary is written. Our results suggest that
the many burdens of the policy far outweigh its
benefits." 30
In contrast to this position, an article in the journal of Ethics, Law and Aging recommended that
DNR policies in nursing homes should be improved
by including requirements for informed consent. A
survey of 117 nursing homes showed that less than
half included such protocols.3 1 The study concluded
that apprising residents of risks, consequences, and
procedures before they make a DNR decision helps
32
to promote understanding and patient autonomy.
Other suggestions for improving nursing home DNR
policies included incorporating clear definitions of
key terminology, documenting rationale for orders,
requiring regular renewal orders with substantive
discussions, and establishing effective protocols for
transferring to hospitals.3 3
While CPR is the presumed response to cardiac
arrest, there has been a continuing evolution in state
laws to allow qualifying patients to prevent resuscitation in various types of settings. One of the newest
expansions of DNR orders permits their use in
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non-hospital settings under legislation and protocols
that have existed for less than ten years.34 Although
all states have statutorily recognized DNR orders in
hospitals as well as end-of-life decisions in living wills
since the 1970s, these documents are generally ineffective for the growing number of terminally ill
patients who are cared for in their homes or in settings other than a hospital.3" Despite being presented
with a living will or durable powers of attorney for
health care, emergency medical providers would resuscitate the patient.3 6 Unwanted emergency
resuscitations have also been cited as a problem for
nursing homes when emergency medical providers
cannot honor a DNR order presented by nursing
home staff.3 7 These problems arise because emergency medical providers, in most states, are legally
required to provide emergency medical treatment,
including CPR. They also have little time or legal
training to investigate and verify the authority of
advance directives and other documents.3"
To help address these issues, during the past ten
years more than forty states have adopted protocols
for the use of non-hospital DNR orders, according
to Sabatino's 1999 descriptive survey.3 9 While most
of the statutes are supplemented by guidelines, a few
states have adopted protocols with no direct code
provisions. The statutes embody diverse provisions
for medical prerequisites, creation and revocation
formalities, identification devices, reciprocity, surrogate issues, and immunity.40 Sabatino concluded that
the statutes showed confusion over the classification
of non-hospital DNR orders as an advance directive
or a doctor's order. He also found that the statutes
generally addressed DNR orders with negative language and lacked consensus on the ideal type of
identification device that must be presented to
emergency medical personnel. As general recommendations, he noted that the DNR order processes
should be simple, DNR protocols should be uniform across all types of care settings, and education
should be provided for emergency medical personnel, health professionals, and the public to ensure
the efficient implementation of non-hospital DNR
protocols.4 1
A Comparison of Non-Hospital DNR Orders in
Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin
Diverse legislation on non-hospital DNR orders has
developed in Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin to address the problem of unwanted emergency
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resuscitations. Florida first enacted legislation allowing non-hospital DNR orders in 1993 (amended in
1999) and Wisconsin in 1995 (amended in 1999).
Legislation for non-hospital DNR orders in Illinois
became effective in 2001. The statutes and regulations in the three states vary not only in their
protocols and implementation, but also in their conceptual approach. Using Sabatino's survey as a
springboard, this section compares the statutes and
protocols using similar descriptive categories: statutory authority, emergency care guidelines,
identification devices, standards for creation and
revocation, medical prerequisites, surrogate/thirdparty authority, immunity, and reciprocity. Also
reviewed is the interaction between non-hospital
DNR orders and living wills.
Non-hospital DNR Orders In Florida
The conceptual approach to the non-hospital DNR
order in Florida is evolving from an advance directive to a declaration that has its own identity.
Interestingly, the 1996 version of the Florida Statute
section 765.101(1) specifically included orders not
to resuscitate in the definition of an advance directive; however, the inclusion was not carried forward
in the 1999 revisions:
"Advance directive" means a witnessed written document or oral statement in which instruction are given
by a principal or in which the principal's desires are
expressed concerning any aspect of the principal's
health care, and includes, but is not limited to, the designation of a health care surrogate, a living will, or an
anatomical gift.. .42

Among other revisions, Florida's 1999 End-ofLife legislation requires a special form for a nonhospital DNR order.43 Despite these changes, the
advance directive statutes in chapter 765 continue
to govern DNR orders in regard to surrogate standards, revocation, penalties, and immunities as
discussed below.
Statutory Authority

The specific authority for withholding resuscitation
by an emergency medical provider upon presentation of a valid DNR order is set forth in Florida

Statutes section 401.45(3). Without a DNR order,
section 401.45(1) provides that consent to CPR is
presumed. A number of other statutes authorize the
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validity of DNR orders in various other health set44
tings, (e.g., nursing homes, hospitals, hospices, etc.).
Specific regulations on Florida's non-hospital DNR
order are contained in the Florida Administrative
Code (F.A.C.) Rule 64E-2.031. This rule, amended
and renumbered, was originally issued on November 11, 1993 as F.A.C. Rule 10-D66.325. It became
effective in its new form on February 20, 2000, pur4
suant to 1999 legislation.
As explained on the website of the Florida Department of Health, 46 End-of-Life Care legislation
was revised under Senate Bill 1890 during Florida's

2000 Legislative Session. The legislation extends the
validity of non-hospital DNR orders across all health
care settings, including hospitals. Although the legislation reaffirmed a physician's authority to write a
DNR order on the patient's medical chart, an emergency medical provider may only honor a DNR order
on the new standardized February 2000 Form 1896.
In addition, the legislation authorized the Secretary

of Health to develop and implement projects to study
the feasibility of a DNR order registry, measure the
impact of public education on end-of-life care issues
and enhance
the availability of data regarding DNR
47
orders.

Emergency Care Guidelines
Under F.A.C. Rule 64E-2.031, an emergency medical technician or paramedic must withhold or
withdraw CPR if (1) presented with an original or
completed copy of the Florida Do Not Resuscitate
Order Form or (2) if the miniature version of the
form is presented or observed on the patient. 48 Additionally, the emergency provider shall provide
"comforting, pain-relieving and any other medically
indicated care, short of respiratory or cardiac resuscitation. ' 49 The emergency medical provider must
verify the identity of the patient and ensure that a
copy of the form or device accompanies the patient
in transport.5 0
Identification Devices
As noted, Florida uses its DNR order form as an
identification device for emergency medical providers. The DNR Order Form 1896 is printed on yellow
paper and has the words "Do Not Resuscitate Order" printed in black and displayed across the top
of the form. A duplicate reproduced on yellow
paper or a miniature version of the form is also
valid. The miniature form is about the size of a
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social security card and may be worn on a chain
around the neck or clipped to clothing."1 Lamination is suggested for protecting the device against
damage.5 2 Under prior regulations, emergency medical providers honored a53special bracelet worn by
patients as a DNR order.
Creation and Revocation Standards
The Florida DNR order form and the identification
device (if used) must be signed by the patient's physician and the patient. If the patient is incapable of
providing informed consent, the form and/or the device must be signed by the patient's health care surrogate
or proxy (as defined in Florida Statutes section
765.101), guardian or person acting pursuant to a
durable power of attorney.14 Although EA.C. Rule 64E2.031 does not provide detailed requirements for
informed consent, the regulations, as well as the order
form, reiterate that the patient's signature is "[b]ased
on informed consent."55 Patients may request the DNR
order form directly from the Florida Department of
Health.16 Under F.A.C. Rule 64E-2.031(6), the DNR
order may be revoked at any time by the patient (if
signed by the patient). The same revocation right is
given to the patient's surrogate, proxy, court-appointed
guardian, or the person acting under a durable power
of attorney. The revocation may be "in writing, by
physical destruction [of the form], by failure to present
it or by orally expressing a contrary intent" pursuant
to the revocation procedures for advance directives
7
under section 765.104.5
Medical Prerequisite and Policies
No medical prerequisites are set forth in F.A.C. Rule
64E-2.031 for the issuance of a DNR order for patients with decisional capacity. However, a
patient-oriented document on the Florida Department of Health website, modified in December 2000,
states that DNR forms "are generally used by someone who is suffering from a terminal condition,
end-stage condition or is in a persistent vegetative
state" and advises principals to consult their physician or attorney to determine "if a DNRO would be
appropriate for you.""8 Technically, under 1999 Endof-Life legislation, it appears that principals who are
able to provide informed consent are no longer limited to the qualifying conditions as set forth in section
765.101 on advance directives:
(4) "End-stage condition" means a condition that is
caused by injury, disease, or illness which has resulted

in severe and permanent deterioration, indicated by
incapacity and complete physical dependency, and for
which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
treatment of the irreversible condition would be medically ineffective.
(12) "Persistent vegetative state" means a permanent
and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which
there is:
(a) The absence of voluntary action or cognitive
behavior of any kind.
(b) The inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the erivironment.
(17) "Terminal condition" means a condition caused
by injury, disease, or illness from which there is no
reasonable medical probability of recovery and which,
without treatment, can be expected to cause death.

Incapacitated patients who are unable to provide
informed consent must meet the medical prerequisites defined above, because surrogates and proxies
act pursuant to section 765.101."
The non-hospital DNR order in Florida also has
other features that conceptually set it apart from an
advance directive. Unlike a living will, the DNR order requires neither witness signatures nor the
separate examination of the patient by an attending
physician and a consulting physician. 0 Prior to the
1999 End-of-Life legislation, the non-hospital DNR
order required similar documen- tation.61 Now, under F.A.C. Rule 64E-2.031(3), the order requires the
signature of only one physician.
Surrogate/Third-Party Authorization
If an incapacitated patient has a qualifying medical
condition, a surrogate or proxy under section
765.10 1, a guardian, or a person acting pursuant to
a durable power of attorney may sign the DNR order Form 1896.62 A "'[s]urrogate' means any
competent adult expressly designated by a principal
to make heath care decisions on behalf of the principal upon the principal's incapacity."6 3 The surrogate
may only make health care decisions for the principal that he or she believes the "principal would have
made under the circumstances if the principal were
capable of making such decisions." 6 4 This decision65
making standard is termed "substituted judgment."
A proxy may also sign a DNR order if the
patient is incapable of informed consent. A proxy
is a "competent adult who has not been expressly
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designated to make health care decisions for a particular incapacitated individual, but who,
nevertheless, is authorized ... to make health care

decisions on behalf of the principal upon the
principal's incapacity.

'6 6

The proxy may be the

patient's spouse; an adult child; a parent; an adult
sibling; an adult relative who has exhibited special
concern for the patient, maintained regular contact
with the patient and is familiar with the patient's
activities, health, and religious or moral beliefs; or a
close friend. 67 Based on a substituted judgment stan-

dard, a proxy's decision to withhold or withdraw
life-prolonging procedures must be "supported by
clear and convincing evidence that the decision would
have been the one the patient would have chosen
had the patient been competent."68
Immunity/Penalties
Although the presumption is that a person may not
be denied CPR, an emergency medical provider in
Florida may withhold or withdraw resuscitation from
a patient without civil liability or criminal prosecution if he or she is presented with a valid DNR order
form. The immunity applies if the provider "has not
'69
engaged in negligent or unprofessional conduct.

Immunity was recently expanded through revised
legislation to include not only emergency medical
personnel but also health care facilities and their
personnel if they honor a DNR order executed pursuant to the statutes. The expansion of immunity to
facilities honoring the standard form may result in
fewer transports to hospitals (i.e., hospital emergency
departments, nursing homes, home health agencies,
assisted living facilities, hospices, adult family-care

70
homes, and emergency medical services).

Penalties for violating a valid DNR order include
fines, civil damages, loss of license, etc. 71 Knowing

or intentional violations are a misdemeanor of the
second degree. 72 Penalties for surrogates and proxies are specified in chapter 765. Damaging an
advance directive without the principal's consent is
a felony of the third degree. Any person who falsifies the advance directive of another or who willfully
conceals personal knowledge of a revocation com73
mits a felony in the second degree.

Reciprocity
Under Florida law, an advance directive validly executed in another state in compliance with the law
of that state will be recognized in Florida. 74 How-

ever, F.A.C. Rule 64E-2.031 and information
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provided by the Florida Department of Health
website clearly indicates that emergency medical
personnel will honor only DNR Order Form 1896.
DNR Orders and Living Wills
Because Florida law recognizes both non-hospital
DNR orders and living wills, the question arises
whether the inclusion of a DNR order in a living
will would be honored if presented to an emergency
medical provider. Under Florida law, emergency
medical providers will withhold or withdraw resuscitation with evidence of a DNR order, and "[a]n
order not to resuscitate, to be valid, must be on the
form adopted by rule of the department [of
health]." 75 Reasonably, a living will or other document that contains a DNR order is not likely to be
honored in a non-hospital setting.
An explanation of Florida's policy on the relationship of DNR orders and living wills is provided
in an online document prepared by the Florida Department of Health. The document explains that a
"living will is a document that instructs, as specifically as possible, what care and treatment the person
wishes under certain circumstances. A DNRO is...
part of a prescribed medical treatment plan and
must have a physician's signature." 76 These comments again emphasize the conceptual differences
between the non-hospital DNR order and the advance directive.
Non-hospital DNR Orders in Illinois
Developed by the Illinois Department of Public
Health, a new standardized statewide DNR order
form was initiated in Illinois in 2001 for use in nonhospital settings.77 Each emergency system in the state
must develop a new DNR policy in accordance with
new regulations of the Department of Public
Health. 7 Even with the new developments in DNR
orders for non-hospital settings, conceptually the
DNR order in Illinois appears to be a combination
of an advance directive and medical treatment, rather
than an independent document. For instance, the
DNR order is listed along with the living will and
power of attorney for health care in a recent statute
on advance directive information and in a Statement
of Illinois Law on Advance Directives available on
the website of the Department of Public Health.7 9
The non-hospital DNR order also maintains its
status as a medical treatment. Under a key provision
in the new DNR order form, a physician has the same
rights as the principal to revoke the order.8 0
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Statutory Authority
The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Act of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes authorizes licensed emergency medical providers to honor DNR orders and
powers of attorney for health care. 1 The specific
protocols for non-hospital DNR orders are set forth
in regulations from the Department of Public
Health.8 2 These regulations mandate policies that
must be developed by each EMS system in Illinois
and approved by the Department of Public Health. 3
Significantly interrelated with non-hospital DNR
orders are statutes in the Health Care Surrogate Act.
This Act defines the circumstances under which surrogate decision makers may make health care
decisions for those persons who do not have health
care agents or advance directives, including decisions
to forgo life-sustaining treatment without judicial
84
involvement.
Emergency Care Guidelines
Under Department of Public Health regulations, "DNR
refers to the withholding of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), electrical therapy to include pacing,
cardioversion and defibrillation; tracheal intubation,
and manually or mechanically assisted ventilations,
unless otherwise stated on the DNR order."815 Presumably, pain and comfort care may be administered,
although it is not explicitly stated in the regulation.
The policies of each EMS must also include procedures
for withholding CPR in situations "where explicit signs
of biological death are present." 6 As another care regulation, emergency medical providers must make a
reasonable attempt to verify the identity of the patient
87
named in the valid DNR order.
Identification Devices
A valid DNR order must be written on a brightly
colored orange form provided by the Department of
Public Health (or reproductions on similarly colored
paper). Illinois has not authorized any other types
of identification devices.88 The statewide DNR order form is available on the website of the
Department of Public Health. 9
Creation and Revocation Standards
Patients or their agents or surrogates may create a
non-hospital DNR order. The new Illinois DNR order form includes the name of the patient, name and
signature of the attending physician, effective date,
and the words "Do Not Resuscitate." Evidence of
the patient's informed consent will be shown by

either the signature of the patient, legal guardian, durable power of attorney for health care agent, or
surrogate decision maker. Because the document is considered an advance directive, the signatures of two
witnesses are also required. 90 Physicians are given considerable authority in the revocation of a non-hospital
DNR order. Revocation of a written DNR order shall
be made only if the order is physically destroyed or
verbally rescinded by the physician who gave the order, or physically destroyed or verbally rescinded by
the person who gave written consent to the order.91
Medical Prerequisites and Policies
The regulations from the Department of Public
Health do not address the medical prerequisites
needed to create a DNR order, but must be coupled
with the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act for an
interpretation of the requirements. The Act states
that "[i]f a patient is an adult with decisional capacity, then the right to refuse medical treatment or
life-sustaining treatment does not require the presence of a qualifying condition."9 2 According to an
analysis by Rebecca O'Neill, patients with decisional
capacity or agents under a durable power of attorney for healthcare may consent to a DNR order as
they would to any other medical treatment. 93 If a
surrogate initiates a DNR order under the Health
Care Surrogate Act, the patient must have a qualify94
ing condition as defined below:
"Qualifying condition" means the existence of one or
more of the following conditions in a patient certified
in writing in the patient's medical record by the attending physician and by at least one other qualified
physician:
(1) "Terminal condition" means an illness or injury
for which there is no reasonable prospect of cure
or recovery, death is imminent, and the application of life-sustaining treatment would only
prolong the dying process.
(2)

"Permanent unconsciousness" means a condition
that, to a high degree of medical certainty, (i) will
last permanently, without improvement, (ii) in
which thought, sensation, purposeful action,
social interaction, and awareness of self and environment are absent, and (iii) for which initiating
or continuing life-sustaining treatment, in light of
the patient's medical condition, provides only
minimal medical benefit.
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(3) "Incurable or irreversible condition" means an illness or injury (i) for which there is no reasonable
prospect of cure or recovery, (ii) that ultimately
will cause the patient's death even if the life-sustaining treatment is initiated or continued, (iii)
that
imposes severe pain or otherwise imposes an inhumane burden on the patient and (iv) for which
initiating or continuing the life-sustaining treatment, in light of the patient's medical condition,
95
provides only minimal medical benefit.

Although the Act does not expressly include resuscitation within a listing of life-sustaining treatments,
it is implied within the definition of life-sustaining
treatment as "any medical treatment, procedure, or
intervention that, in the judgment of the attending
physician, when applied to a patient with a qualifying condition, would not be effective to remove the
qualifying condition or would serve only to prolong
96
the dying process.
Surrogate/Third-Party Authorization
As previously noted, surrogate decision-making is
limited to the creation or revocation of DNR orders
for patients who lack decisional capacity and advance
directives. The Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act
defines "surrogate decision makers" as adult individuals who are identified by the attending physician
in accordance to the Act and who are willing to make
medical treatment decisions on behalf of a patient
who lacks decisional capacity.97 The Act specifies that
surrogate decisions involving the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment require that the patient have a
98
qualifying condition.
Surrogates, in order of priority, include the patient's
guardian, spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling,
adult grandchild, close friend, and the patient's guardian of the estate. 9 A close friend must provide an
affidavit to the attending physician that he or she is a
close friend who wants to become involved in the
patient's healthcare and who is familiar with the
patient's activities and beliefs. The affidavit must specify
00
the facts that substantiate the relationship.
The standard for making surrogate decisions
is "conforming as closely as possible to what the
patient would have done or intended under the circumstances." 10 1 The surrogate may consider the
patient's personal, philosophical, religious, moral,
and ethical beliefs, or be guided by living wills or
other documents that are not revoked but invalid
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because of technicalities. If the patient's wishes cannot be discerned, then the surrogate must weigh "the
burdens on and benefits to the patient of the treatment against the burdens and benefits of that
treatment as well as views of family and friends that
the patient may have considered if able to act for
herself or himself." 102 Consequently, the Act provides
that a surrogate should first use a substituted judgment standard. If this standard is unrevealing, then
the surrogate may use the best interest standard. 103
When the provisions of the Act are complied with,
the attending physician may implement a decision
to forgo life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the
patient. A physician, however, may refuse to implement the decision if she or he believes it violates the
Act or for "reasons of conscience or other personal
1 04
views or beliefs."
Immunity/Penalties
Neither the Emergency Medical Services Act of the
Illinois Compiled Statutes'0 nor the DNR order
policy regulations from the Department of Public
Health 1T explicitly provides immunity to emergency
medical providers who honor valid DNR orders.
Implied immunity may be gleaned from the recognition of the EMS protocol as part of the standard of
practice along with general and partial immunity
granted in other parts of the EMS code. 10 7 Health
care providers who follow the provisions of the
Health Care Surrogate Act will not be subject to
claims based on lack of patient consent or to criminal prosecution for unprofessional conduct. The Act
does not protect providers from negligence claims in
carrying out their duties. Likewise, surrogates are
protected from criminal prosecution or any claim
based on lack of surrogate authority if they act with
due care and in accordance with the Act. 08 The Act
provides no specific penalties for violations of its
provisions.109
Reciprocity
The Emergency Medical Services Act of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes and Department of Public Health
regulations are silent on whether emergency medical
providers must honor valid DNR order forms from
other states. However, the recognition of a DNR order
form that is unfamiliar to the emergency medical provider would be unlikely in light of the movement toward
a standardized form that was purposely developed to
ease identification in emergency situations.
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DNR Orders and Living Wills
The Emergency Medical Services Act of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes authorizes licensed emergency
medical providers in Illinois emergency systems to
honor DNR orders and powers of attorney for health
care. 110 However, the regulations on DNR orders
from the Department of Public Health state that a
living will by itself cannot be recognized."' Thus, an
individual who has a living will or a living will within
a power of attorney for health care should also create a DNR order with a physician's signature to
assure that CPR will be withheld by an emergency
medical provider.
Non-hospital DNR Orders in Wisconsin
Wisconsin first enacted legislation recognizing nonhospital DNR orders in 1995, by permitting the
issuance of standardized DNR bracelets to qualified
patients. Often termed the "bracelet bill,"
Wisconsin's legislation on non-hospital DNR orders
is designed to serve the needs of those elderly patients who are cared for at home and who desire to
forgo CPR.11 2 Overall, Wisconsin's non-hospital
DNR order has its own identity and is conceptually
and statutorily independent, in large part, from an
advance directive or a physician's order.
Statutory Authority
Wisconsin's non-hospital DNR order is authorized under sections 154.17(1), 154.19(2)(b), and
154.27 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Additionally,
the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family
Services (Division of Public Health) provides specific regulations and procedures for emergency
medical providers to follow when honoring nonhospital DNR orders.113 The Division of Public
Health is revising its regulations to reflect two major recent legislative changes: (1) the ability of
guardians and agents with a health care power of
attorney to request or revoke a DNR order, and (2)
the legal option of using a metal or plastic DNR
14
bracelet.'
Emergency Care Guidelines
The DNR order is defined as a written order that
directs emergency providers not to attempt CPR for
those persons whom the order is issued."' Emergency
medical providers must honor a DNR order, as
evidenced by a patient wearing a DNR bracelet, un1 16
less the bracelet is defaced or the order revoked.
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Resuscitation under Wisconsin law means CPR or
any component of CPR. The components are described as "cardiac compression, endotracheal
intubation and other advanced airway management,
artificial ventilation, defibrillation, administration of
cardiac resuscitation medication and related procedures. Resuscitation does not include the Heimlich
maneuver or similar procedures used to expel an obstruction from the throat." 117 The emergency medical
provider may also provide comfort care such as the
administration of oxygen, clearing the airway, controlling bleeding, positioning for comfort, providing
emotional support, and providing pain medication
and splinting.'
Identification Devices
Wisconsin's DNR bracelet is statutorily defined as a
standardized identification bracelet of uniform size,
color, and design approved by the Division of Public
Health that includes the inscription "Do-Not-Resuscitate" and signifies that the wearer has obtained a
DNR order.119 Therefore, the bracelet gives legal
notice of the order.120 As one option, the bracelet
may be a clear, standard hospital-type bracelet of at
least an inch wide. The bracelet insert form must
include the words "Do Not Resuscitate" printed in
blue, the state seal of Wisconsin, and, on the left
side, the patient's name, address, date of birth, and
gender in font size eight or greater. The physician
who issues the DNR order is responsible for completing the bracelet insert and must place his or her
name, business phone, and original signature on the
right-hand side of the insert form.121 Physicians may
obtain bracelet inserts from the Division of Public
Health.
Under an amended statute, the Division of Health
may also approve a metal bracelet. The metal bracelet must be developed and distributed by a
commercial vendor, include an emblem that displays
an internationally recognized medical symbol on the
front and the words "Wisconsin Do-Not-Resuscitate-EMS" and also include the qualified patient's
first and last name on the back. Vendors must have
a doctor's order for the bracelet prior to distributing
it to the patient. 122
Creation and Revocation Standards
The creation of a DNR order by an adult patient
under Wisconsin statutes involves several steps.
First, the patient (or if incapacitated, the patient's
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guardian or health care agent123 ) must contact the
patient's attending physician or a person under the
direction of the attending physician.124 An attending
physician is defined as a licensed physician who has
the primary responsibility for the treatment and care
of the patient.12 The attending physician or the
physician's designee must provide the patient with
written information about the resuscitation procedures that the patient has chosen to forgo and the
methods by which the patient may revoke the DNR
order. The physician or the designee must document
the medical condition that qualifies the patient for
the DNR order in the patient's medical records. After the physician or the designee writes the DNR
order, the patient or guardian/agent must sign the
order. Then, either the physician affixes the bracelet
to the wrist of the patient, or the patient receives a
form to order the bracelet from a vendor. 126 As noted,
Wisconsin accepts only vendors that require a
physician's DNR order before distributing the brace7
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effective in 1998.132 Jane Barclay Mandel notes that
the practical application of the provision is difficult
because emergency medical providers must determine
if the patient is incapacitated and if the person providing the revocation is the patient's guardian or
health care agent. Because there is little time for investigation, emergency medical providers will likely
resuscitate the patient unless the person demanding resuscitation states that he or she has no legal

authority. 133
Medical Prerequisite and Policies
The Wisconsin statute has a restrictive listing of
medical conditions that are required before any patient (competent or incapacitated) may create a DNR
order:
A "qualified patient" means a person who has attained
the age of 18 and to whom any of the following condition applies:

12

let.

A patient may revoke a DNR order at any time by
expressing his or her desire to the emergency medical
provider; by defacing, burning, cutting, or destroying
the DNR bracelet; or by removing the bracelet or by
asking another to remove the bracelet. As soon as possible after the revocation, a patient must notify his or
her attending physician so that the patient's medical
records may be changed. The revocation, however, is

(a) The person has a terminal condition.
(b) The person has a medical condition such that, were
the person to suffer cardiac or pulmonary failure, resuscitation would be unsuccessful in restoring cardiac
or respiratory function or the person would experience repeated cardiac or pulmonary failure within a
short period before death occurs.

effective regardless of the notification.1 28 General pro-

visions on DNR orders provide that "the desire of the
patient to be resuscitated 29
supercedes the effect of the
1
DNR order at all times."

A recent amendment has also given a guardian
or health care agent of the patient a right to revoke
the bracelet on behalf of the patient by directing
emergency medical personnel to resuscitate the patient.13 0 Regulations under Division of Public Health
had provided that the patient's desire not to be resuscitated was controlling:
If a member of the patient's family or friend of the
patient request that resuscitative measures be taken,
that person's request does not supercede the do-notresuscitate order for the patient if the patient iswearing
a valid do-not-resuscitate bracelet and has not revoked
the order.
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The Division of Public Health is currently revising
its regulations to meet the new law that became

(c) The person has a medical condition such that, were
the person to suffer cardiac or pulmonary failure, resuscitation of that person would cause significant
physical pain or harm that would outweigh the possibility that resuscitation would successfully restore
cardiac or respiratory function for an indefinite pe13 4
riod of time.

Definitions in section 154.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes that apply to the withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures as documented in living wills provide
some additional insight. A terminal condition is defined as an incurable condition caused by an injury
or illness that will result in imminent death. A

persistent vegetative state, statutorily defined as a condition that results in the irreversible loss of all cognitive
functioning,1 35 is not expressly listed as a qualifying
condition for a DNR order. It appears that a persistent
vegetative state must meet the criteria of either section
(b) or (c) above to qualify as a medical prerequisite.
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Surrogate/Third-Party Authorization
As noted, recent Wisconsin DNR legislation provides
expanded powers for guardians or health care agents
of incapacitated patients that may make it difficult
for emergency medical providers to assess the legal
authority of third parties in emergency situations.
Guardians and health care agents may create a DNR
order on behalf of an incapacitated qualified patient
or may revoke the patient's existing DNR order. An
emergency medical provider must honor a guardian's
or health care agent's verbal request for resuscitation even though the patient is wearing a valid DNR
bracelet. In this case, the emergency medical provider must promptly remove the DNR bracelet. The
guardian or health care agent may also deface, burn,
13 6
cut, or remove the bracelet.
The DNR statute is silent on the standard to be
used by third parties to create or revoke a DNR order. General decision-making standards for health
care agents are set forth in Chapter 155 of the Wisconsin Statutes (Power of Attorney for Health Care).
A health care agent "shall act in good faith consistently with any valid declaration executed by the
principal under subch. II of 154 [Declarations to
Physicians]."1 37 In the absence of a directive, the standard is to "act in the best interests of the principal."138
The best interests standard also applies to health care
decision-making by guardians.' 39
Immunity/Penalties
Physicians, emergency medical providers, first responders, health care professionals, or emergency
health facilities may not be held criminally or civilly
liable or charged with unprofessional conduct for
withholding or withdrawing resuscitation from a
patient who has a DNR order. Emergency medical
providers also face no liability for failing to act upon
a revocation of an order unless they had actual
knowledge of the revocation. Likewise, there is no
liability if the emergency medical provider fails to
honor a DNR order if he or she in good faith be140
lieved the order to be revoked.
Wisconsin imposes stiff penalties on those
who knowingly violate a patient's DNR orders or
revocation of those orders. Any person, including
an emergency medical provider, who willfully conceals, defaces, or damages a DNR bracelet without
the patient's consent may be fined up to $500 and/
or imprisoned for not more than thirty days. A
$10,000 fine and/or possible imprisonment for not
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more than fifteen years will be imposed if a person
intentionally causes the withholding or withdrawal
of CPR contrary to the patient's wishes, forges or
transfers a DNR bracelet, or conceals the revocation of the DNR order. Those who directly or
indirectly coerce, threaten, or intimidate an individual
to create a DNR order may receive up to a $500 fine
and/or up to thirty days imprisonment.141
Reciprocity
The DNR statutes are silent on whether a non-hospital DNR order from another state may be honored
by emergency medical providers. However, under its
general provisions for declarations to physicians,
Wisconsin will enforce a valid document from another state that authorizes the withholding or
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures if the document is consistent with Wisconsin laws.1 42 As noted
in the next section, the DNR statutes appear to recognize DNR orders in living wills. Conceivably, this
recognition could extend to documents from other
states. In a practical application, determining whether
a DNR order from another state is consistent with
Wisconsin laws is difficult.
DNR Orders and Living Wills
The Wisconsin statute on DNR orders expressly provides that it "does not impair or supersede ... [a]

persons right to withhold or withdraw resuscitation.' 1 43 Therefore, DNR orders contained in living
wills or in a power of attorney for health care document would also be valid in emergency situations.
In addition, these documents could possibly outline
DNR desires to include broader circumstances than
those required in the statute. 44 Considering liability
concerns, it is unlikely that emergency medical providers would honor these documents.
Summary of DNR Criteria in Florida, Illinois,

and Wisconsin
The statutes and protocols examined in this article
illustrate how varied states may be in their approaches to non-hospital DNR orders. Although
Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin seek to provide
individuals with greater flexibility in effecting their
own health decisions, their statutes and protocols
take varying approaches to identification devices,
medical prerequisites, surrogate authority, revocation, reciprocity, and the interrelationship of DNR
orders with other types of advance directives.
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The most striking variation centers on medical
prerequisites for creating DNR orders for patients
having decisional capacity. In Illinois, statutory interpretation has led to a conclusion that there are no
qualifying medical conditions for a patient who is
14s
able to give informed consent to a DNR order.
Likewise, in Florida, public information provided on
the Department of Health website indicates that
strictly defined medical prerequisites possibly may
not apply for patients with decisional capacity who
wish to create a non-hospital DNR order.146 Wisconsin has the most restrictive requirements, in that
qualifying patients by statute must have a terminal
condition, a condition in which resuscitation would
be futile because cardiac failure would occur again
in a short time, or a condition in which the pain or
harm of resuscitation would outweigh its advantages. 147 As another difference, Wisconsin statutorily
requires specific procedures to ensure informed consent upon the creation of a DNR order. Physicians
or their designees must provide patients with written information about resuscitation procedures as
14
well as revocation procedures. 1
Advance directives are crucial in Wisconsin in
that third-person authority to create or revoke a nonhospital DNR order extends only to health care
agents and guardians. Both Florida and Illinois set
forth provisions allowing for DNR decision-making
by non-agents such as spouses, children, and even
49
close friends.1
Although the recognition of non-hospital DNR
orders in documents other than state-approved forms
or devices provides flexibility for patients, it creates
a serious problem for medical providers who need
clear signals in an emergency situation. For instance,
in Wisconsin, DNR orders such as living wills and
powers of attorney for health care apparently may
be honored by emergency medical personnel even
50
though the patient does not have a DNR bracelet.1
Both Florida and Illinois are more explicit in requiring the statewide-approved form for non-hospital
emergencies.'
Overall, all three states have designed a relatively
simple statewide form for creating a DNR order that
is available from physicians or the Department of
Public Health. These three states permit surrogates
to create and revoke a DNR order for incapacitated patients with qualifying medical conditions and
provide immunity from liability for emergency medical providers who follow statutory and regulatory
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guidelines for DNR orders. In addition, these states
have updated their statutes and protocols and emphatically provide that patients with decisional
capacity may revoke their DNR order at any time.

Recent Cases Interpreting Statutory
Standards for DNR Orders
DNR case law to date, in large part, relates to DNR
orders in hospital settings because of the relative
newness of DNR orders in non-hospital settings.
Generally, DNR orders result in court cases where
providers seek a declaratory judgment to approve a
decision whether to issue a DNR order for an incapacitated patient with no advance directives. Less
frequent are cases that seek damages from providers
for injuries caused by actions or omissions of a DNR
order.1 2 This section briefly reviews four recent cases
involving the interpretation of statutory provisions
imposing standards for issuance of DNR orders for
elderly patients.
In In re Estate of Austwick, the Illinois Appellate Court interpreted a section of the Illinois Health
Care Surrogates Act ("IHCSA") dealing with statutory requirements that govern a guardian's decision
to consent to a DNR order on behalf of an elderly
patient.153 In this case, an eighty-one-year-old disabled woman, through the Legal Advocacy Service
of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, petitioned the probate court to terminate the
DNR order in her medical chart at the nursing
home where she was residing. She also petitioned
for the removal of her public guardian because he
failed to follow the procedures of IHCSA when consenting to the DNR order on her behalf. After the
trial court ordered the DNR order removed, the public guardian argued on appeal that Mrs. Austwick
had decisional capacity when she first consented to
the DNR order and that IHCSA authorizes a guardian to consent to a DNR order on behalf of a
54
patient.
The Appellate Court found that IHCSA authorizes
a surrogate decision maker to forgo life-sustaining treatment for a patient only when the patient lacks decisional
capacity and has a qualifying condition. The court concluded that Mrs. Austwick did not have a qualifying
condition because she was not terminally ill, irreversibly comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state. Further,
her adjudication as disabled did not overcome the presumption under IHCSA that she has decisional
capacity 55
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In a related case, the Appellate Court of Illinois
reviewed whether Mrs. Austwick had decisional

capacity to refuse electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)
as a treatment for depression. The administration
of ECT was also sought on her behalf by her public guardian.1 6 Interestingly, the court held that she
did not have the capacity to refuse treatment and
reconciled the two court decisions as follows:
We recognize at first glance our holding may seem to
conflict with a related case involving Mrs. Austwick in
deciding whether to forgo life-sustaining treatment...
However, in that case we were interpreting the Health
Care Surrogate Act (HCSA), which states that a person is presumed to have decisional capacity to forgo
life-sustaining treatment unless her attending physician
states otherwise and one other physician concurs. No
such statements appear in Mrs. Austwick's medical
records, and therefore we held that under the HCSA
1 57
we must presume she has decisional capacity.

The court determined that Mrs. Austwick's incapacity was established in the ECT hearing through the

testimony of one physician. Because of conflicting
testimony, the court held that the trial court erred in
determining that ECT was in Mrs. Austwick's best
interest.
Both Austwick cases illustrate the dangers that

may arise with surrogate decision-making. The
guardian, in these cases, believed he was making a
well-intentioned decision in the best interest of his
ward. However, IHCSA first requires the surrogate
to use substituted judgment when making a DNR
decision. If there are no indications of the patient's
desires, then the decision may be made under the

best interests standard that weighs the benefits to
and burdens on the patient in light of what a reasonable person would choose.'
The Austwick cases also stand for several pro-

positions. First, elderly persons should be presumed
to have decisional capacity with a legal right to participate in their own medical decision-making.
Physical deterioration cannot automatically be
equated with diminished mental capacity. Second,
when acting on behalf of an incapacitated person,
surrogates must carefully follow the legal standards

set forth for protecting the principal's best interests.
Surrogates do not have unrestricted discretion. Fi-

nally, medical decisions for elderly persons should
not be made solely on the basis of the person's age.

Some researchers have found that physicians are
more likely to issue a DNR order for older patients
than younger patients when all other conditions are
equal. 159 Whether such decisions are based on ageism or on sound medical reasons, the laws in Florida,
Illinois, and Wisconsin define explicit medical and
legal circumstances for consent to a DNR order on
behalf of an incapacitated person.
In the case of In re Finn, a lower New York court
found that a DNR order issued under article 29-B of
New York Public Health Laws did not meet the medical prerequisites of the statute. 160 Although Leonard
B., a sixty-seven-year-old profoundly retarded man,
lacked the capacity to make a decision regarding the
DNR order, his physician erred in writing the order
because his medical condition did not meet the prerequisites for a surrogate-initiated DNR order. The
New York law provides that a surrogate may obtain
a DNR order for an incompetent patient only if "'(i)
the patient has a terminal condition, (ii) the patient
is permanently unconscious, (iii) resuscitation would
be medically futile or (iv) resuscitation would impose an extraordinary burden on the patient in light
of the patient's medical condition and expected outcome of resuscitation for the patient.""'16 The court
found that the first three conditions did not apply to
Leonard and held that the final condition was constitutionally vague because it failed to define the
meaning of an extraordinary burden.1 62 An appeals
decision concurred that the DNR order was improper
but vacated the lower court's judgment that the New
York Public Health Law was unconstitutionally
1 63
vague.
Despite the appeals decision, this case raises questions about the clarity of statutory standards for
determining whether resuscitation would be medically ineffective or medically futile. These statutes
focus on situations in which the treatment is not
beneficial because of the resulting pain or harm it
may cause to the patient or because the patient's
medical condition will result in death despite lifesustaining treatment. To avoid attacks for vagueness,
state legislatures should be working with medical
professionals and attorneys to develop more precise
legal standards for medical futility, situations where
64
the use of CPR would be futile.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In light of recent criticisms of the Patient SelfDetermination Act in creating awareness of advance
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directives, 165 there is a definite need for more public
outreach aimed at elderly persons and their families.
To fill this gap, it is important for elder law attorneys to make special efforts to apprise their clients
of new state laws on non-hospital DNR orders and
their interrelationship with other types of end-of-life
documents. As illustrated in the above cases, elderly
persons are often dealt with in a paternalistic manner. Even if elderly patients have expressed their
end-of-life choices to family, friends, or their physicians, surrogates may not be bound to consider these
wishes. In Wisconsin, it appears that a health care
agent or guardian may even supercede a valid nonhospital DNR order.166 To avoid the prospect of an
unwanted resuscitation in a non-hospital setting,
attorneys must help their clients understand the im-
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portance of formalizing their end-of-life decisions
prior to loss of capacity.
Elder law attorneys also have an important role in
helping develop clearer statutory language relating to
the benefits versus burden test of medical futility. Much
of the concern with this issue arises when a surrogate
requests a DNR order on behalf of an incapacitated
patient who has no written advance directives.
In summary, whenever advising a client regarding health care decisions, an attorney must
understand not only the law but also how it interacts with the client's personal situation, values and
beliefs. With this in mind, the attorney will be able
to work with the client to develop an integrated and
coordinated plan that best reflects the client's wishes
and right to self-determination.

Endnotes
1. Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State
Laws, Uniform Health-CareDecisions Act Prefatory Note (1994).

2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 cc(f). See also BARRY R.
ET AL., HEALTH LAW 1114 (3d ed. 1997).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii);

compares medical prerequisites, DNR order
formalities, identification devices, reciprocity,
statewide uniformity, surrogacy issues, immunity,
and data collection and evaluation. Id. at 297-307.

FURROW

6. Frances Meehan, DNR Orders-JudicialAuthorization or Statutory Mandate?", 24 AM. HEALTH
LAWS' ASS'N J. OF HEALTH L. 144, 144 (1991).

BARROW ET AL.,

supra, note 2.
4.

5.

Proposed legislation, entitled Advance Planning and
Compassionate Care Act of 1999, was introduced
in the 106th Congress (H.R. 1149; S. 628) as an
effort to strengthen provisions of the Patient SelfDetermination Act. As noted in the Congressional
Record, since the passage of that legislation a study
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation "found
that less than half of hospitalized patients who had
advanced directives had even talked with any of
their doctors about having a directive and only
about one-third had their wishes documented in
their medical records." 145 Cong. Rec. E 499 (Mar.
18, 1999) (statement of Rep. Levin). See also
Elizabeth H. Bradley et al., Public Information and
Private Search: Evaluating the Patient Self-Determination Act, J. OF HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 239, 240
(April 1999).
Charles P. Sabatino, Survey of State EMS-DNR
Laws and Protocols,27 J. L. MED. & E-ics 297,
297 (1999). Sabatino's survey found that, as of
September 1999, forty-two states have adopted
protocols for the use of non-hospital DNR orders.
Id. The comprehensive survey of state laws

7.

Id.

8.

John A. McClung et al., Legislating Ethics-

Implications of New York's Do-Not-Resuscitate
Law, 323 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 270, 270 (1990)
(citing W. B. Kouwenhoven et al., Closed-chest
CardiacMassage, 173 JAMA 1064 (1960)).

9. Id. (citing Statement by the Ad Hoc Committee on
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation of the Div. of
Medical Sciences, Nat'l Academy of Sciences Nat'l

Research Council, CardiopulmonaryResuscitation,
198 JAMA 372 (1966)).

10. Id. (citing Standards for CardiopulmonaryResuscitation (CPR) and Emergency Cardiac Care (ECC)
227JAMA Supp. 833 (1974)).

11. Id. (citing C. Fried, TerminatingLife Support: Out
of the Closet!, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED. 362 (1976)).
12. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
13.

FURROW ET AL.,

supra note 2, at 1106.

14. 355 A.2d at 655.

I Elder's Advisor

15. Id. at 664.

16. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1106.
17. Meehan, supra note 6.

18. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1144; N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2960 et seq. (Consol.).
19. Meehan, supra note 6.

20. FURROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 1143.
21. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE S 9.4, at 544 (2d
ed. 1995, 2000 Supp.); FURROW ET AL., supra note 2,
at 1143.
22. See N.Y PUB. HEALTH

LAW

§ 2962 (1) (Consol.).

23. See MEISEL, supra note 21, § 9.19 at 567. The states
include Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, New
York, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

24. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES,
ELDERLAW 539 (2d ed. 1999) (citing ALAN MEISEL,
THE RIGHT TO DIE 56 (2D ED. 1995)).

25. Id. at 542 (citing Dunham v. Wright, 423 E2d. 940,
941 (3rd Cir. 1970)).

26. Meisel, supra note 21, at 568. See AR. CODE ANN.
§ 20-13-905(d); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-1-104(4).

31. Leslie Walker et al., Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in
Nursing Homes: InstitutionalPolicies and Practices, 1 J. ETHICS LAW. & AGING 97, 101 (1995).
32. Id. at 104. There is a continuing debate about when
physicians are legally required to obtain informed
consent when withholding CPR or writing a DNR
order. The traditional view holds that physicians are
required to obtain informed consent to write a
DNR order. An emerging view holds that informed
consent is necessary only when physicians recommend a procedure to a patient or surrogate. See
MEISEL, supra note 21, § 9.5 at 547-48 and Supp. at
140. However, there is legal risk in a physician
"unilaterally writing a DNR order without consulting the patient or surrogate." Id. § 9.6, at 555.
33. Walker, supra note 31, at 104.
34. Sabatino, supra note 5, at 297.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Walker, supra note 31, at 103.
38. Jane Barclay Mandel, Wisconsin's Do Not Resuscitate Bracelet Law Raises Legal and Medical Issues,
70-Dec. Wis. LAW. 14, 15 (1997).
39. Sabatino, supra note 5, at 297.

27. Arnold Wagner, M.D., Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation in the Aged: A Prospective Survey,
310 NEW ENGL. J. OF MED.1129, 1130 (1984). The
reported study surveyed 163 elderly women regarding their attitude toward CPR and found only
eleven who wanted CPR in case of a cardiac arrest,
seventy-seven who did not want CPR, sixty-four
who wanted a physician to decide, ten who were
incompetent, and one who did not return the
survey.

40. Id. at 298-301.

28. Gary E. Applebaum, M.D. et al., The Outcome of
CPR Initiatedin Nursing Homes, 38 J. AM. GERIATRics Soc'y, 197, 200 (1990). However, several
studies have found that advanced age is not unfavorable to a successful outcome. See e.g., R.S.
Gulati et al., CardiopulmonaryResuscitation of
Old People, 2 LANCET 267 (1983).

45. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64E-2.031 (see history).

29. Applebaum, supra note 28, at 198.
30. Id.

41. Id. at 312.
42. FLA.

STAT.

Ch. 765.101(1).

43. Ch. 401.45(3)(a).
44. Ch. 395.1041, 400.142, 400.4255, 400.487,
400.6095, 400.621, 401.35.

46. Fla. Dept. of Health, Do Not Resuscitate Orders,
available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/ems/lgeneral/ 6resuscitate/dnro.htm (last modified Dec.

2000).
47. Id.

48. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64E-2.031 S (1)(a)-(b).
49. R. 64E-2031 S5.

ARTICLE I Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Non-Hospital Settings

50. R. 64E-2031 §§ 4-5.

39

judgement permits the patient to 'control' the
decision."

51. Fla. Dept. of Health, supra note 46.

66. FLA.
52.

FLA. ADMIN. CODE

ANN.r. 64E-2.031

STAT.

ch. 765.101 (15).

S 2(a)-(b).
67. Ch. 765.401(1).

53. Raymond L. Parri, If I Call 911, Is My Living Will
Any Good? The Living Will v. the DNRO, 60 FLA.
BARJ.

68. Ch. 765.401(3).

82, 82 (1996).
69. Ch. 401.45 (3)(b).

54. FLA.ADMIN.

CODE

AN.r. 64E-2.031

§ 3.

55. Fla. Dept. of Health, DH Form 1896 Fla. Do Not
Resuscitate Order (Rev. Feb. 2000). See also FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64E-2.031 § 3.

70. Fla. Dept. of Health, supra note 46. See also Fla.
Dept. of Health, DH Form 1896 Fla. Do Not
Resuscitate Order (Rev. Feb. 2000).

71.

FLA. STAT.

ch. 401.45.

56. Fla. Dept. of Health, supra note 46.

57. FLA. ADMIN.

CODE

ANN.r. 64E-2.031

§ 6.

58. Fla. Dept. of Health, Do Not Resuscitate Orders,
supra note 46 (emphasis added). According to the
Department of Health, neither FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN.r. 64E-2.031 nor FLA. STAT. ch. 401.45(3)(a)
reflects medical prerequisites to create a nonhospital DNR order for patients with decisional
capacity. Previously, the same medical bases that
apply to withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures under a living will had to be present
for the creation of a non-hospital DNR order. See
also The Fla. Bar, Florida GuardianshipPractice
S 3.9 (1998).

59. FLA. ADMIN.
60.

FLA. STAT.

CODE

ANN.r. 64E-2.031

74. Ch. 765.112.
75. Ch.401.45(3)(a).
76. See Fla. Dept. of Health, supra note 46.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 515.380(e). The form
has been available for use on the Department of
Public Health's website since March 2001, although
its official effective date is July 1, 2001. See Ill.
Dept. of Pub. Health, State of Illinois Do Not
Resuscitate (DNR) Order, available at http://
www.idph.state.il.us (last visited Mar. 2001).

77. ILL.

ch. 765.302; 765.306.

ANN. r. 64E-2.031 § 3; see also
FLA. STAT 765.205(1)(c) specifically giving surrogates the authority to create a DNR order.

62. FLA. ADMIN.

STAT.

73. Ch.765.1115(1)-(2).

§ 3.

61. Parri, supra note 53, at 83, citing previous regulation FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN.r. 1OD-66.325(3)(b),(d)
(1995).

63. FLA.

72. Ch. 395.1041(5). The absence of a DNR order,
however, does not preclude a physician from
withholding or withdrawing CPR as otherwise
permitted by law. Ch. 395.1041 (3)(1).

CODE

ch. 765.101(16).

78. Tit. 77 § 515.380(a).
79. 20 ILL. COMp. STAT. 2310/2310-600; Ill. Dept. of
Pub. Health, Statement of Illinois Law on Advance
Directives, available at http://www.idph.state.il.us/
public/books/advdir4.htm (last visited Mar. 2001).
80. ILL.

ADMIN. CODE

64. Ch.765.205(1)(b).

81. 210 ILL. COMp.

65. See FROLiK & BARNEs, supra note 24, at 584, noting
that the doctrine of substituted judgement means
"that the surrogate health care decisionmaker
substitutes the intent, desires, and values of the
patient for his or her own when making a medical
care decision for the patient. In theory, substituted

82. ILL.

tit. 77,

STAT.

ADMIN. CODE

§ 515.380 (g)(1).

50/3.55(c).

tit. 77,

§§ 515.380 (a)-(m).

83. Tit. 77 § 515.380(a).

84. 755 ILL. CoMP.
85.

STAT.

ILL. ADMIN. CODE

40/5.

tit. 77, § 515.380(a).

I Elder's Advisor

86. Tit. 77, § 515.380(c).
87. Tit. 77, § 515.380(h).
88. Tit. 77, S 515.380(e).
89. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2310/2310-600(b)(5) and
supra note 77.
90. Id. Although ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, S 515.380
does not specify the requirement for two witness
signatures, the EMS Division of the Department of
Public Health advised that the DNR order is
considered an advance directive. The new form,
therefore, follows the witness requirements outlined
for advance directives (e.g., living wills). See 755
ILL. COMP. STAT 35/3.
91. Tit. 77, S 515.380(g).
92. 755 ILL.
STAT.

COMP. STAT.

40/15; see also 755

103. Id. See also Mark Stephen Bishop, Crossing the
DecisionalAbyss: An Evaluation of Surrogate
Decision-MakingStatutes as a Means of Bridging
the Gap Between Post-QuinlanRed Tape and the
Realization of an Incompetent Patient's Right to
Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 7
ELDER L. J. 153 (1999) (providing a comprehensive review of surrogate decision-making under
the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act).
104. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20 (f). A physician who is
unable to comply with a decision to forgo lifesustaining support for personal reasons must
promptly notify the administration of the health
care facility. 755 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 40/35.

105. 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3.55.
106. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, S 515.380 (a)-(m).

ILL. COMP.

107. Sabatino, supra note 5, at 303.

40/20 (a).
108. 755 ILL. COMP.

93. Rebecca J. O'Neill, Surrogate Health Care Decisions for Adults in Illinois-Answers to the Legal
Questions That Health Care ProvidersFace on a
Daily Basis, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 411, 446-47
(1999). Based on an analysis of the definitions in
755 ILL. Comp. STAT. 40/10, O'Neill concludes
"although persons with decisional capacity do not
have a qualifying condition as defined under the
Health Surrogate Act, they have the authority to
consent to DNRs." Unless there is limiting language
in a durable power of attorney for health care, an
agent may also consent to a DNR order "even
though the principal does not have a qualifying
condition under the Health Care Surrogate Act."Id.
94. 755 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 40/15; see also O'Neill, supra
note 93, at 447.
95. 755 ILL. COMP.

STAT.

40/10.

96. Id.; see also O'Neill, supra note 93, at 446-47.

STAT.

40/30(b)-(c).

109. O'Neill, supra note 93, at 463.
110. 210 ILL.
111.

COMP. STAT.

50/3.55.

ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77,

§ 515.380 (f).

112. Mandel, supra note 38, at 15.
113. Wis. ADMIN. CODE HFS § 125.01-125.05.
114. Wis. Dept. of Health and Family Services,
Statement of Scope of Proposed Rules: 535 Wis.
ADMIN. REG. 17 (July 31, 2000), available at
http:/www.dhfs.state.wi.us/news/rules (last visited
Mar. 2001).
115. Wis. STAT.
116.

5

154.17(2).

§ 154.19(3)(a); Wis. ADMIN CODE HFS
§ 125.05(3).

97. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10.

117. Wis. STAT § 154.17(5).

98. 40/20 (b)(1).

118. Wis. ADMIN. CODE HFS § 125.05(2)(d).

99. 40/25(a) (1)-(8).

119. Wis. STAT. S 154.17(1).

100. 40/10.

120. Mandel, supra note 38, at 15-16.

101. 40/20 (b)(1).

121. Wis. ADMIN CODE HFS § 125.04.

102. Id.

122. Wis.

STAT.

S 154.27.

ARTICLE I Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in Non-Hospital Settings

123.

§ 154.225(2).

or withhold life-sustaining medical treatment for
an incompetent patient who was in a persistent
vegetative state. The patient had no living will or
power of attorney for health care. However, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to extend
this holding to incompetent patients who are not
diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state
in In re Guardianship of Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d
485 (Wis. 1997). As noted earlier in this text's
discussion of medical prerequisites for a DNR
order, it is unclear whether a persistent vegetative
state is a qualifying condition under the Wisconsin statute. See supra, note 135.

124. S 154.19(2).
125.

§ 154.01(1).

126. § 154.19(1)-(2).
127.

§ 154.27(2).

128.

§ 154.21 (1)-(2).

129.

S 154.25 (6m).

130.

S 154.225.

131. WIs. ADMIN. CODE HFS

41

140. Wis. STAT. § 154.23(1)-(3).

§ 125.05 (4).

132. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. Both
Florida and Illinois also provide for verbal
revocation by surrogates, but the authority
appears to be more restricted than in Wisconsin.
In Illinois, only those surrogates or proxies who
gave written consent to a DNR order may revoke
it. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 515.380(g). In
Florida, revocation by surrogates follows the
requirements established for advance directives.
See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64E-2.031 § 6. A
revocation cannot contravene the previously
expressed intent of the principal. See FLA.STAT.

S 765.205.
133. See Jane Barclay Mandel, Legislature Revises
State's Do-Not-ResuscitateLaw, 71-June WIs.
LAW. 2, 2 (1998).
134. WIs. STAT. § 154.17(4). The physician cannot
issue a DNR if he or she knows the patient is

pregnant. Id. § 154.19(1)(e).

STAT. § 154.29; Wis. ADMIN
§ 125.05 (6).

141. Wis.

142. Wis.

STAT.

CODE

HFS

S 154.11(9).

143. Id. § 154.25(4)(a).
144.

BETSY ABRAMSON ET AL., ADVISING OLDER CLIENTS

AND THEIR FAMILIES at

§ 15.103 (State Bar of Wis.

CLE Book 1998 with 2000 Supp.).
145. See O'Neill, supra note 93 and accompanying
text.

146. See Fla. Dept. of Health, supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148. Wis. STAT. 5 154.19(2)(a).
149. See supra notes 67 and 99.
150. See ABRAMSON ET AL., supra note 144 and accom-

135. § 154.01(5m).
136. § 154.225; see also Robert J. Best, Legal Guardians' Authority to Consent to Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders, ELDER'S ADVISOR, Fall 1999 at 9, 1314(reviewing Wisconsin cases on surrogate
decision-making).

137. § 155.20(5).
138. Id.
139. See In re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60,
69 (Wis. 1992). In this case, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin found that the best interests standard applied to a guardian's decision to withdraw

panying text.
151. See supra notes 75 and 111 and accompanying
text.
152. Lawrence W. Vernaglia, J.D., Annotation,
Proprietyof, and Liability Related to, Issuance of
Enforcement of Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
Orders,46 ALR 5th 793, 799 (1997).
153. 656 N.E.2d 773, 775 (I11. App. Ct. 1995), mod.
and reh'g denied 656 N.E.2d. 779, (1995).
154. Id. at 776.
155. Id.

I Elder's Advisor

42

156. In re Austwick, 656 N.E.2d 779, 781-82 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
157. Id. at 783.
158. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/20(b)(1); see supra notes
101-103 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Marshall B. Kapp, J.D., M.P.H.,
De Facto Health-CareRationing by Age: The
Law Has No Remedy, 19 J. OF LEGAL MED. 323,
331 (1998).
160. 625 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995),
mod., aff'd, Finn v. Leonard C., 221 A.D.2d 896
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995).

and developmentally disabled as second-class
citizens and any perceived possible diminution in
their 'quality of life' could be a basis for the
denial of lifesaving treatment." Id.
163. Finn v. Leonard C., 221 A.D.2d at 897.
164. See generally George P. Smith, II, Utility and the
Principleof Medical Futility: Safeguarding
Autonomy and the ProhibitionAgainst Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
8C POL'Y J. 1, 10-13 (1995)(reviewing definitions
of medical futility). See also Mark Strasser, The

Futility of Futility?: On Life, Death and
Reasoned Public Policy, 57 Md. L. Rev. 505,
523-24 (1998).

161. Id.

165. See supra note 4.

162. Id. at 813. The court explained that the "'extraordinary' burden provision of the statute
opens the door to the treatment of the mentally

166. See Mandel, supra note 133 and ABRAMSON ET AL.,
supra note 144, at Supp. § 15.103.

